In his federalist essays, James Madison reflects on why and how certain types of governments succeed and others do not. In order to fully understand why the American government reaches a level of success, we must first examine what does not work within government action. Let us keep in mind that while the American government can generally be described as "working", it is by no means perfect or without flaws.
"From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions" (Federalist Essay No.10).
"There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests" (Federalist Essay No.10).
states that " pure democracy...a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person can admit no cure for the mischiefs of faction", meaning that a small group of people who operate the government directly, as opposed to through representatives, cannot solve the problems a faction brings about. As shown in the second quote above, the only way to "cure the mischiefs of a faction" is to control it's effects, (destroying liberty goes against the very ideals and values that America is built on, and thus is not a practical solution, and is in fact counter-effective to the freedom American's sought to obtain during the revolution). In smaller populations, it is more likely that the majority will of the people will maintain similar views, and thus there is no other voice to be heard that may check the credibility of a vote. Government officials who favor this type of government often make another error: assuming that by "reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights", or giving every man equal political input, their opinions, values, and goals would also be equalized. With this assumption being incorrect, this type of equality among men, all obtaining conflicting interests, only leads to "turbulence and contention."
"The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets" (No. 10).
"In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions....The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit" (No. 51).
Within a government that administers it's own men as representatives of the well being of society, it is the responsibility of the people to appoint representatives that will work with the interest of the greater good in mind ("enable the government to control the governed"), and then to constrain them to working justly. While certain government tasks may tempt officials to "overburden the inferior number", or the lesser classes, in order to save money from "their own pockets", it is required of the people to then trust in the government they had elected, which is why "precautions" must be taken in order to prevent corruptions such as these. The necessary precautions are clearly stated: "divide the legislature into different branches" and give them each "different principles of action." However, the branches contains a certain amount of power over another, so that no one section becomes too powerful. This is known as the system of checks and balances, which has enabled our government to control itself from the inside out.
"In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters" (No.10).
Within this type of government, there is a greater probability that worthy officials are chosen. When in a democracy, the majority of the people maintain similar opinions, it is likely that smaller voices will be unheard. However, when a large group of people votes, a more diverse range of views and hopes for the future are heard, and it is likely that many people will notice corruption within a candidate, even if many others do not. Thus, the government will truly be beneficial for the whole of society, as it will have been chosen in account to the opinions of many, as opposed that of one small majority.
In short, it is not to say that the American govenment goes without corruption or fault, however, one can be honestly say that it maintains the greatest approach to addressing the needs of a true majority, which combined with the trust the American people instill in their elected officials, and the system of checks and balances, allows America to be deemed a successfully functioning country.
I agree that Madison emphasized on having representatives in the government whom the people selected when he mentions that "In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic." He opted for democracy and he also believed that "however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few" because smaller group can turn out worse than a big group of representatives for they can conspire against the government easily.
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